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The model of the multinational enterprise (MNE) has changed dramatically over the last two
decades, especially in terms of the role of knowledge creation in the MNE. From the 1960s into
the early 1980s, the dominant perspective in International Business viewed the MNE as developing
a knowledge-based advantage in its home country and then exploiting it by extending its
production system into geographically dispersed markets (see for example Vernon, 1966; Buckley
& Casson, 1976; Dunning, 1981; Rugman, 1981). From the mid-1980s on, however, studies of
the MNE have increasingly shifted their focus from the questions of why, how, and where a firm
ventures beyond its home country borders to the emergent advantages of an established
international network of subsidiaries (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1986; Kogut, 1983; Kogut, 1985a;
Nohria & Ghoshal, 1997; Solvell & Zander, 1995). Chief among these advantages is a greater
capacity for generating innovations. In other words, the focus of the study of the MNE has shifted
from viewing geographic dispersion as a result of knowledge creation to seeing dispersion as a
source of knowledge creation.l
The shift in focus has reflected both the growing attention to innovation and knowledge
creation in theories of strategy and organization in general (Nelson & Winter, 1982 and Nelson's
1995 review article) and changes in MNEs themselves -- that is, it reflects both theoretical and
empirical developments. One of the key features of the evolution of the MNE in the last decade has
been the growing internationalization of research and development (R&D). As a result of the
evolving technological capabilities of long-established subsidiaries and, perhaps even more
strikingly, of the large-scale cross-border mergers and acquisitions of the 1980s, many MNEs
increasingly found themselves with sizeable R&D centers outside their home country (Hakanson,
1990). A growing body of research on the internationalization of R&D has blossomed under the
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dual stimuli of managerial concerns with effective management of dispersed technology
development units and scholarly interest in the internationalization processes of R&D, the last
major function of the MNE to go abroad 2. As international strategy in the 1980s came to focus
heavily on the Triad of the highly-industrialized economies, and as MNEs developed an established
network of increasingly capable subsidiaries there, one of the key organizational questions became
how MNEs could leverage their existing network for competitive advantage, rather than where and
how they expanded their presence.
The advantages of the MNE in knowledge creation rest on one or more of the following
characteristics:
(1) Variety in environmental stimuli: Because MNEs are by definition active in more than one
national environment, they are exposed to a wider variety of customer, competitor, and technology
stimuli to innovation than are domestic firms (see for example Ghoshal, 1987: 431). The MNE
here functions as a global scanner, in Ray Vernon's terms (Vernon, 1979: 261), sensing and
responding to a diverse array of environmental signals.
(2) Dispersed innovation centers: The established MNE contains centers that generate innovations
for local use in a variety of locations. The MNC can identify and select those which have
potentially wider applicability and ensure their adoption in other locations. The MNC here is seen
as a selection regime, in the terminology of population ecology, selecting for and proliferating
certain innovations.
(3) Joint knowledge creation: The dispersed innovation centers can combine their resources and
capabilities to create knowledge jointly, in a variety of ways. 3 In this context, the MNC functions
as a knowledge-creating network.
The fact that the MNE contains knowledge widely dispersed across its various local
subsidiaries does not necessarily mean that it has developed this third capability. The geographic
dispersion of R&D provides only the potential for joint knowledge creation; not all MNEs with
international R&D centers have developed the organizational capability for realizing that potential.
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Nonaka has identified this cross-border synergistic process as "global knowledge creation," and
sees it as the key process of globalization (Nonaka, 1990: 82).
This paper explores the patterns and nature of cross-border knowledge creation in the R&D
function. We should note that this is a deliberately narrow focus on one aspect of the more general
topic of multinational knowledge creation processes. Of the four types of multinational innovation
processes identified by Bartlett and Ghoshal (1986; 1989) and elaborated in Nohria & Ghoshal
(1997), only one involves "joint cross-border knowledge creation" processes in the R&D function:
their "globally-linked" pattern, or what Nohria and Ghoshal call "global-for-global". The other
three types -- local-for-local, central-for-local, and locally leveraged (or local-for-global) -- center
on single-location knowledge creation rather than cross-border interactive knowledge creation, at
least as far as the R&D function is concerned, although they may involve cross-functional joint
knowledge creation. This paper focuses on the questions of how widespread cross-border
knowledge creation is within the R&D function, first within firms with internationally dispersed
R&D units and then between firms and external foreign sources of technology, and what
organizational and managerial systems support cross-border knowledge creation within companies
that have a geographically dispersed R&D function. Finally the paper suggests some concepts for
analyzing cross-border knowledge creation processes.
CROSS-BORDER KNOWLEDGE CREATION IN FIRMS WITH INTERNATIONAL R&D
UNITS
During the last decade, studies of the internationalization of R&D -- that is, the
establishment or acquisition of R&D centers outside a company's home base -- have suggested that
cross-border interaction in knowledge creation is increasingly important in MNEs. But in fact
most studies map the geographic dispersion of R&D rather than the level of cooperation in
technology development across the dispersed units, whether the analyses are based on patenting
(e.g. Cantwell, 1989) or on surveys of companies (e.g. Casson, 1991). An R&D center outside a
3
company's home base may indeed be engaged in joint knowledge creation with the parent R&D
organization, or even with other dispersed R&D centers in the company. Alternatively, it may be
engaged in quite autonomous knowledge creation, either as the sole "center of excellence" for a
product or technology within the company, or as what Ronstadt called the Indigenous Technology
Unit (ITU), whose mandate is primarily developing products for the local market. There are also a
handful of studies of global new product development projects that involve cross-border
knowledge creation (e.g. Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1990; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, Ch. 7; Hedlund
and Ridderstrale, 1995), but such projects are clearly not typical of their companies'
knowledge-creation activities, however strategically important they may be. In other words,
although there is a widespread belief that cross-border knowledge creation is important, we have
little data to tell us how extensive it is.
A recent research project at MIT provided an opportunity to explore this issue and a number
of related topics. In 1994-95, together with Tony Frost (then also of MIT, now at the University
of Western Ontario), I conducted a survey of the global management of R&D under the auspices of
the Industrial Research Institute based in Washington, D.C., whose member companies account
for roughly 80% of the industrial R&D spending in the United States. One-third of the
association's member companies agreed to participate: 70 U.S. firms, and 12 foreign-owned firms
with R&D centers in the United States (10 European companies and 2 Asian). Of the 70 U.S.
firms, 43 had R&D centers outside the United States (we called this kind of company FIRDUs --
that is, firms with international R&D units -- not out of a perverse desire to add yet another
acronym to the MNE literature, but to reduce writer and reader fatigue over the constant reiteration
of "firms with international R&D units). The other 27 U.S. firms did not have R&D centres
outside the U.S., although most were "multinational enterprises" in the classic definition of the
term, with sales and production outside their home country; we called this type of firm the HRDU
- firms with home-based R&D units only.
The unit of analysis in this study was not the company, but the technology development
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unit - that is, one level below the company/function level that has been the usual focus of
organizational studies of the internationalization of R&D and a level above the individual project
level that has been the focus of studies of knowledge creation. Obviously the project level is
best-suited to the analysis of knowledge creation processes, but the organizational capabilities that
sustain the capacity for knowledge creation are best studied at the organizational level. However,
in multi-business, multi-national companies, the R&D function has increasingly been segmented
into distinct organizational units linked to a specific business area or (in the case of corporate R&D)
technology area. Given the resulting intra-company variation, a company-level analysis is too
coarse-grained to capture much of the information necessary to understand better the development
of the organizational systems that sustain cross-border knowledge creation. Therefore, despite the
many problems involved, we elected to direct our study to the R&D unit, or rather, the technology
development unit.
Our pilot study revealed that our initial label of "R&D Unit" met some resistance from some
of the participating companies, who eschewed the connotation of "blue-sky academic research" that
they associated with the use of "research" (as in R&D unit), and preferred the more neutral term
"technology development unit". We defined this as a "technical unit engaged in any stage of the
technology development process, from fundamental research to design, development, engineering
or modification of products, processes, or technologies", but specifically omitting technical units
engaged primarily in technical service and support. In other words, we focused on units engaged
in technical knowledge creation, both radical and incremental, and in this paper I shall use the
terms "R&D unit" and "technology development unit" interchangeably in describing them. The IRI
representative from each of the 82 participating companies identified a set of unit heads within the
company seen as appropriate targets for the study, and questionnaires were mailed from MIT to
these individuals. A total of 318 responded, giving a response rate of 77.4%. The questionnaire
was followed by a set of over 40 face-to-face interviews in units in the United States, Europe, and
Japan.
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Although we found that in many companies technology development units were quite
specialized in terms of product or technology, most, even those that were relatively small, covered
more than one stage of the R&D value chain (which we operationalized by a question asking about
the importance of various types of technology development in the unit's current mandate). Exhibit
I shows the distribution of units in terms of the four core activities of: developing basic or
fundamental technology; developing break-through new products; developing new generations of
current products; and process innovations. 4
EXHIBIT 1 ABOUT HERE
Only 30 of the units (fewer than 10%) had a single mandate (one additional unit identified a fifth
activity, "modifying products developed by other units", as its only important mandate in the value
chain). Somewhat surprisingly, there was no significant relationship between the size of the unit
in terms of the number of technical personnel and the number of mandates it covered. In our
interviews and our presentations of the data for the IRI members, it became obvious that this
finding reflected the fact that many companies have cut their R&D organization into smaller units
that are directly linked with individual businesses and cover the entire R&D value chain for a single
business or product family, in order to increase their responsiveness to market pressures.
The 318 responding units were distributed across five categories, depending on ownership,
dispersion of R&D, and location, as follows. We had three categories of US-owned units: those
in firms without international R&D units (subsequently referred to as HRDUs); the home country
(i.e. US-located) units in firms that did have international R&D units (FIRDUs); and units in the
US FIRDUs that were located abroad (primarily but not exclusively in Europe). We also had 33
units that were located in the United States but belonged to non-US-owned FIRDUs, and 12 of
their home country units. In other words, the map of responding units was as follows:
OWNERSHIP DISPERSION OF R&D LOCATION
Without International
I ,R&D Units (HRDUs)
US OWNED--- -- I Located in US
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I With International I (Home units)




NON-US OWNED-With International I (Foreign subsidiaries)
R&D Units (FIRDUs) I
I Located outside US
(Home units)
Exhibit 2 provides further information on each of these five categories of units.
EXHIBIT 2 ABOUT HERE
The companies covered a range of industries, and reflected to some extent IRI participation:
supplier industries were strongly represented, especially the chemical industry. Over one-third of
the units (37%) were from the chemical industry; and 23% were from engineering and machinery.
Of the remainder, 14% were in drugs and medical equipment, 9% in materials, and 9% in
consumer products. Only 2% were in electronics, and 6% were classified as "other". This means
that the industries which have been best represented in published case studies of cross-border new
product development processes (consumer products and electronics) were much less well
represented in our study, in favor of more "mature" industries where one might expect the
pressures for cross-border interactions in technology development to be less strong.
Nevertheless, we found cross-border knowledge creation to be extensive. The most direct
question could be asked in the FIRDUs (firms with international R&D units). In the version of our
questionnaire tailored to such firms, we asked what percentage of their products or technologies
involved cooperation with other R&D units in the company but located outside the country in
which the respondent was located. Exhibit 3 provides the distribution of the responses.
EXHIBIT 3 ABOUT HERE
These data support the belief that there is widespread cross-border interaction in knowledge
creation in firms that have internationally dispersed R&D organizations. As one would expect, in
the US-owned companies, foreign units report a higher level of cross-border interaction in
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technology development than do the home country units. Over 40% of the home units report
cooperating with foreign R&D units on less than 25% of their products or technologies. Nearly
two-thirds of the foreign units, on the other hand, interact with R&D units outside their country of
location for more than half of their product/ technology portfolio. Given that the overwhelming
majority of these foreign units are in Europe, and that many have interactions with other European
units in their company, this is perhaps not surprising. The foreign-owned R&D centers in the US
fall between the home country and foreign units of the US companies: one-third are relatively
autonomous (this reflects a broader pattern in the data -- units in this category are very US-focused
and less integrated with the rest of their company on a number of dimensions, a pattern which is
perhaps not surprising given the size and scope of the US market). We cannot view the very small
number of home units of non-US firms as a group that is comparable to the US firms' home units:
the number is too small, and the very fact of their participation in a US-based study indicates their
very strong international orientation. Of course, we cannot claim that the US home units are
"typical", since they were selected by their company representatives as units that might have an
interest in participating in a study of global technology management. But the fact that more than
half of these units are involved in cross-border interactions with foreign units in the company for
over one-quarter of the products or technologies on which they are working indicates extensive
cross-border knowledge creation.
The MIT-IRI study provided evidence that cross-border knowledge creation is extensive,
both across units within MNEs and between those units and external partners in other regions. But
the survey instrument was not well-suited to probing the nature -- as opposed to the extent -- of
cross-border knowledge creation processes. For that kind of information, we relied on the
interviews, in which we asked for examples of recent cross-border technology development.
These examples were not detailed case studies, but very brief descriptions of recent cross-border
cooperation, ranging from (for example) a major four-year new product development project
involving technology units in the US, Europe, and Japan to an interaction of a few weeks duration
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in which a local subsidiary in Europe worked with the business unit headquarters' R&D
organization in the United States to modify a product and get it appropriately field-tested. In the
course of the interviews, it became increasingly clear that while the cross-unit product development
project was the dominant form of international knowledge creation, it was by no means the only
one. Knowledge creation was occurring outside specifically cross-unit projects -- as for example
when someone from one unit flew into another unit to help solve a particular problem, or learn
more about a particular set of customer needs.
This was reflected in the responses to a set of questions in the survey about the reasons for
sending people abroad to other units in the company. These data are presented in Exhibit 4, which
divides the responding units into three categories: low cross-border interaction (those with 25% or
less of their products and technologies involving cooperation with other company units outside the
country in which they are located); medium cross-border interaction units (25-50%) and high
interaction units (more than 50%).
EXHIBIT 4 ABOUT HERE
While project-related travel clearly predominates, especially in the high-interaction units, more
general learning -- about technology and markets, and technology transfer -- is also important, and
is almost as important in the medium and low interaction units as in the high. And of course,
administrative coordination of various kinds is also a major reason for travel -- again particularly in
the high-interaction units. But the key point to draw from these data is the range and variety of
cross-border knowledge creation activities in MNEs.
The IRI sponsors and participating companies, however, were of course less interested in
the extent of cross-border knowledge creation than in how to manage the process more effectively.
We used both the questionnaire and the interviews to explore the question of how companies
strengthen their cross-border knowledge creation capabilities.
In the 1990s, the concept of organizational capabilities has been increasingly used in the
analysis of strategy (see for example Aaker, 1989; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; and Stalk, Evans &
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Shulman, 1992) and of technology management (e.g. Leonard-Barton, 1992). Several terms were
used as this perspective evolved -- resources, invisible assets, strategic assets, capabilities, core
competences. Gradually, however, the field has converged on the term "capabilities" and on
several defining features: capabilities develop over time, involve complex interactions among
resources (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993) and across levels (Leonard-Barton, 1992), and are a source
of competitive advantage in large part because they are hard to imitate. And one of the reasons they
are hard to imitate is that they involve dynamic interactions across levels within the organization:
the level of individual skills and capabilities, the routines of the work process, and two
organization-level variables: organizational systems (for R&D, human resource management
systems, project management systems, and resource allocation systems are particularly crucial),
and organizational culture.5 While a study such as the MIT-IRI study, which focuses on
organizational units rather than projects, is not able to illuminate significantly the first two levels of
analysis (the individual and the work process routines), it is useful for analyzing the organizational
systems level. The following section examines the extent of internal cross-border knowledge
creation patterns in the U.S. FIRDUs, and the organizational systems that support them.
CROSS-BORDER KNOWLEDGE CREATION CAPABILITIES IN FIRMS WITH
INTERNATIONAL R&D UNITS
The organizational systems used to link units in a geographically dispersed R&D system
are key elements of cross-border knowledge creation capabilities. As one of the leading European
scholars who has studied the internationalization of R&D, Arnoud de Meyer of INSEAD, has put
it, "Learning about different markets, different problem-solving methods, different sources of
technological progress, different culture, different competitors, and the rapid diffusion of that
learning through the organization is definitely enhanced by creating an international network of
R&D laboratories" (De Meyer, 1992: p. 169). Drawing on work by De Meyer (especially De
Meyer, 1991) and on input from the sponsoring committee of the IRI, we developed a list of ten
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mechanisms used to link technology development centers located in different countries into such a
network, and asked the survey respondents in the FIRDUs to tell us whether they had used them,
and how they rated the effectiveness of those they did use (obviously this question was omitted
from the version sent to the HRDUs).
Not surprisingly, virtually everyone uses the standard communications links of frequent
long-distance interpersonal communication through phone, fax, and email, and short international
visits. But for other mechanisms, such as personnel transfers and some of the resource allocation
systems, the percentage of units where they are not used is relatively high -- almost half, in the
case of short-term transfers of personnel. Therefore we calculated an "effectiveness ratio", which
is the percentage of those units using the particular mechanism that rated it as effective (either 4 or
5 on a 5-point scale). Exhibit 5 presents the percentage of FIRDU units rating the mechanism as
"effective" (that is, a 4 or 5 on the 5-point rating scale), the percentage not employing each
particular mechanism, and the effectiveness ratio for those that did.
EXHIBIT 5 ABOUT HERE
Not surprisingly, the standard long-distance communications links (phone, fax, and email)
were virtually universally employed and received a high effectiveness rating. The major exception
in terms of effective ratios was among the foreign subsidiaries in the United States (note: this
breakdown is not shown in the Exhibit), who gave the "frequent communication by phone, fax,
and email" a startlingly low effectiveness ratio of 51.5%, a low rate that holds for this group
regardless of the amount of cross-border interaction on technology development (it is only 54%
even for the units for whom 50% or more of their products and technologies involve cooperation
with R&D units outside the US). While one might first be tempted to look to a cultural explanation
(for instance, that the home country business cultures of these units may be less comfortable with
such arm's length communications mechanisms than the US firms), in fact it seems to be related to
a pattern revealed in other indicators in the survey and in the interviews: a very strong orientation
among these units to the local U.S. market and a high proclivity for autonomy from parental
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control (which presumably also includes resistance to parental efforts at regular communication).
These units were also less enthusiastic about the other virtually ubiquitous linkage mechanism,
short visits; the effectiveness ratio among the foreign-owned units in the US was 10% lower than
the units in the US FIRDUs, either at home or abroad.
The highest effectiveness ratio went to video conferencing. Our interviews revealed that
R&D managers viewed this as a very useful way to reduce travel for meetings, although not to
eliminate it (discussed further below). Moving people is still, however, the key mechanism for
linking R&D units, and in this function short visits are key to the communications networks,
receiving the next highest effectiveness ratio and being used by virtually all the units. The data
from another of the survey questions reveals this even more strongly. We asked unit heads to tell
us approximately what percentage of their technical personnel had travelled in the past year to
technical units in the company outside the country in which they were located. These data are
presented in Exhibit 6.
EXHIBIT 6 ABOUT HERE
For roughly 80% of all the FIRDU units in all categories, 10% or more of their technical staff had
travelled internationally within the R&D network at least once in the past year; more startlingly, in
the US FIRDUs 40% of the home units and 60% of the foreign units reported that a quarter or
more of their technical personnel had done so. Not surprisingly, there was a relationship between
this travel ratio and the size of the unit, but primarily for the units with very high travel ratios (50%
or more): 31% of the units with under 15 technical employees had a travel ratio of over 50%,
compared to 20% of the units with 60 or more.
Most of this travel is of course in the form of short visits. But in addition, companies
transfer technical people on longer assignments. We distinguished two types of people movement
that involve formal transfers of technical personnel: transfers of under six months (called
"short-term transfers") and those of more than six months ("long-term transfers"). Based on
preliminary discussions, we learned that six months is usually the cut-off point in terms of whether
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the transfer is viewed as "temporary" and therefore not needing the re-establishment of the
person's household in the new location. Long-term transfers had a higher effectiveness ratio, but
also a high proportion of units who didn't use them. Short-term transfers were even less common,
and more of the units were ambivalent about their effectiveness. Neither type of transfer received
as high an effectiveness rating as short visits.
The interviews clarified the different roles of these three types of cross-border people
movement. Short visits, obviously, had a clearly targeted mission, and were best used to solve
problems (either technical or managerial coordination problems) or to maintain relationships that
were supplemented between visits by other forms of communication, such as video conferencing.
Short-term transfers were tied to specific projects, and also had a clear target. They were seen as
effective for transferring technology, either into or out of the unit. Long-term transfers, on the
other hand, are most effective in building individual cross-border capabilities, in terms of a deep
understanding of a different business and technical environment and the development of lasting
personal networks across units. However, they were seen to have high costs, both literally (in
terms of the costs of re-establishing a household in a new country), and in terms of the problems
they create for managers. Long-term postings are not usually tied to a specific project, and
therefore the "host" unit has to find a role for the incoming person; the "sending" unit usually has
to replace him or her, and then find a role for the person upon return. Moreover, the growing
number of dual career households in the U.S. was frequently cited in interviews as a factor making
technical personnel less flexible in taking long-term transfers abroad.
Short-term transfers do not have these disadvantages, but several managers pointed out in
the interviews that people were less likely to return from them with a broad understanding of the
local business and technical environment and that they developed less dense and sustained personal
ties (since they viewed themselves and were viewed by others as "transients" rather than members,
however temporary, of the unit). As several managers pointed out, if a company were systematic
about using a mix of short-term transfers and visits, repeated postings and visits to the same
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international site might well serve as a functional equivalent of long-term transfers in terms of their
effect on individual border-crossing capabilities, but few U.S. companies have the Human
Resource Management systems in place in their R&D organizations to make such long-term
planning possible.
In fact, most companies do not use short and long term transfers as functional equivalents:
nearly half the units (46.1%) use both, and over a quarter (28.7%) use neither; 15.9% use
short-term but not long-term transfers, and only 9.3% use long-term transfers and not short-term.
Of the companies that use both, over half see them as equally effective (57.1% -- but as effective
for different purposes, as the preceding discussion indicates); 17.6% see long-term transfers as
effective but not short-term, and 9.2% see only the short-term transfers as effective. The
remaining unit heads -- a surprising 11.8% of those using both types -- did not view either as
particularly effective.
The balance among the different modes of moving people across borders in R&D is
especially noteworthy given the fixation of studies of human resource management in the MNE on
the expatriate manager (that is, on long-term transfers). In the R&D function, the cross-border
movement of technical people is much more extensive for short visits and for transfers (those
dubbed "long-term" here as well as the short-term transfers) that are much shorter than the three to
five years normal for expatriate managers. For the most part, this cross-border movement of R&D
personnel has none of the infrastructure of cross-cultural training and mentoring provided in many
companies for "expats". For the knowledge-creating company, improving the effectiveness of the
much more numerous short-term transferees and the engineers sent into new cultural and technical
environments for short visits -- and often on short notice -- is much more important than further
improving the infrastructure for the much less numerous (and in many companies shrinking)
number of longer-term expatriates. In our interviews, managers provided some suggestions of
how to do this, such as providing designated "local mentors" who have the formal responsibility of
helping the visiting engineer or scientist to understand the local environment and improve his or her
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interactions in it. This is an arena that would benefit from much more extensive and systemic
research.
For the resource allocation and decision-making systems, the lowest effectiveness ratio, to
our surprise, went to "systems for allocating the costs and benefits of joint activities". In work
with several companies prior to this study, we had found that the absence of such a system was
often cited as a serious source of problems, and yet, although such systems are in place for 60% of
the units in this study, they don't seem to work very well. One inference from these data is that it
confirms the view that the geographic dimension of decision-making is a fundamental problem in
product-based business-unit structures; another is that companies might be advised not to invest
heavily in trying to construct systems for allocating costs and benefits among geographically
dispersed units, but to rely instead on strengthening other means of cross-unit coordination.
The low effectiveness ratio given to "frequent meetings of top-ranking managers" was less
surprising, given how widely managers in MNEs today complain about the level of travel required
for meetings. Although these are widely used, they are not highly valued for effectiveness by half
the units. We used two additional resource allocation systems variables that we thought would be
closely and inversely related: "different but complementary areas of expertise" and "some overlap
of areas of technical expertise". We hoped by this question to discover whether units were using a
strategy of differentiation of technical expertise or of redundancy. In fact most units reported using
both: only 21 units (8.1%) reported having overlapping areas of expertise but not different but
complementary areas, and only 5 (2.0%) reported the reverse. Either we didn't ask the question
clearly enough, or the overlap reported confirms the need for some redundancy even with a
differentiation strategy, in order to assure absorptive capacity in technology interactions (Cohen &
Levinthal, 1990).
Designating a single unit as the worldwide leader for technology development within a
business unit or technical area was used by more than three-quarters of the units' companies, but
only two-thirds of them found it effective. There were, as one might expect, significant variations
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by category: units in the home country found the idea more attractive than the foreign subsidiaries,
probably because they were more likely to be designated as the leader. The effectiveness ratio
among U.S. FIRDUs' home country units was 68.9%, whereas it was 57.1% among the
US-owned subsidiaries abroad. It fell to 36.7% among the US-located subsidiaries of non-US
MNEs, but their parent company units gave it a 100% effectiveness rating!
It may seem somewhat redundant, but it is also useful to look at these ratings by the units'
level of cross-border interaction in technology development. Like Exhibit 4 above, Exhibit 7
divides the responding units into the three groups of low, medium, and high interaction.
EXHIBIT 7 ABOUT HERE
For all ten mechanisms, the percentage of units without experience of the mechanism falls as the
cross-border interaction level rises. This is especially noticeable for video conferencing, which is
used in virtually all of the high interaction units. For several variables, the effectiveness ratio also
rises with the level of cross-border interaction, as we would expect (especially for frequent
meetings of top managers). However, there are some interesting departures from this expected
pattern. The effectiveness ratio for long-term transfers is very high in the high-interaction units,
and significantly higher than for medium-interaction units; however, for short-term transfers the
ratio is lower, and it is virtually equivalent to the ratio given by the medium-interaction units,
suggesting that the linkages and individual capabilities created by long-term transfers of people are
most valuable when interaction levels across units are high. More surprising is the curvilinear
relationship for two mechanisms: a system for allocating the costs and benefits of joint activities,
which is most valued by the medium-interaction units and least by the low and the high, and
designating a single unit as world-wide leader, which exhibits the same pattern. Both suggest that
formal allocation systems may be most useful when interactions across borders rise above a certain
level, but that as interaction rises to higher levels, they have more difficulty satisfactorily dealing
with the complexities. 6 This is a point made by both Gunnar Hedlund and by Bartlett and Ghoshal
in their discussions of the "heterarchical", less formalized management systems appropriate for
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companies with very dense levels of cross-border interdependencies.
An additional organizational system variable about which we enquired in the questionnaire
proved to have an interesting, though not unexpected, relationship with cross-border knowledge
creation. We asked the respondents to evaluate the importance of a set of factors in how they
personally were evaluated and rewarded as R&D unit managers. The responses varied
considerably both by the level of cross-border interaction in technology development and by the
category of unit (US-owned FIRDUs, home country and foreign, and non-US FIRDU units in the
United States). The data for the three factors that exhibited significant differences by interaction
levels are presented in Exhibit 8.
EXHIBIT 8 ABOUT HERE
In the US FIRDUs, both home country and foreign units, the unit heads in high interaction units
(those in which over 50% of their products or technologies involved cooperation with other
company units outside their country of location) were much more likely to assert that cross-unit
cooperation was an important factor in how they were rewarded than were low and medium
cross-border interaction units. The foreign unit heads were somewhat more likely to believe that
cooperation played a role in their evaluation, perhaps because the units with whom they were most
likely to be cooperating were the home country units closest to headquarters and therefore likely to
have influence in the evaluation process. On the other hand, the non-US-owned unit heads were
much less likely to believe that international cooperation was significant in their evaluation and
reward, regardless of level of cross-border interaction. These data are from a single point in time,
and it is notoriously dangerous to try to infer causality from correlation. But these data do provide
some support for the view that behavior that is rewarded is more likely to be observed than
behavior which is not. The fact that a number of the other survey indicators show that the
non-US-owned units resisted cross-border integration efforts and were strongly locally oriented is
unlikely to be independent of their view of how their heads are evaluated.
In summary, then, the MIT-IRI survey revealed that cross-border knowledge creation was
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extensive, and that the movement of people played a key role,- in terms of short visits and
short-term transfers, as well as longer-term expatriate assignments of the conventional type. The
different modes of moving people have different effects on the development of organizational
capabilities and impose different costs on sending and receiving units, and this aspect of
cross-border knowledge creation cries out for more detailed research and analysis in the future.
The development of management systems to support cross-border knowledge creation seems to be
more difficult when interaction levels -- and hence presumably the complexity of interactions -- are
high.
Cross-border knowledge creation is not, of course restricted to the dispersed internal
network of the MNE. Let us turn now to the exploration of external cross-border knowledge
creation links.
CROSS-BORDER KNOWLEDGE CREATING LINKS WITH EXTERNAL ORGANIZATIONS
In the last decade and a half, technology development links with organizations outside the
company, both at home and abroad, have become an increasingly important aspect of knowledge
creation for many companies. International external technology linkages are an especially
important tool for internationalizing the knowledge creation processes of firms that do not
themselves have international R&D units.
In the questionnaire, we asked respondents if their units had engaged in joint technology
development projects in the past two years with six types of organizations in each of the three
major regions: North America, Europe, and Asia. The organizations were: a general category of
"Alliances, joint ventures, and consortia"; "competitors" (both these two categories we considered
to be "horizontal alliances" involving similar firms); customers; suppliers outside the company
(these next two constituted "vertical" linkages); universities and public research institutes; and
technical consultants (these last two being different kinds of "expert organizations"). The data we
collected on external alliances are less informative than the information we gathered on internal
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cross-border knowledge creation, since we asked only about whether the unit has engaged in
technology development projects with external organizations in other regions, not about the
importance or the effectiveness of these activities.
Even so, the results are striking. If we focus particularly on the international links of the
two categories of US-owned units located in the United States, the HRDUs and the home units of
the US FIRDUs, we find an impressive international reach for both, with surprisingly little overall
difference between them. A very high proportion of both had some kind of knowledge creating
linkage with organizations in Europe (75% of the HRDUs and 79% of the FIRDUs), and about
half had at least one link with an external organization in Asia (47% and 57% respectively). But as
these figures indicate, the linkages of both types of units are much denser in Europe than in Asia,
and there are some interesting differences between the two types of units, as we can see from that
data presented in Exhibit 9.
EXHIBIT 9 ABOUT HERE
One observation from these data may be worth noting. In the 1980s, critics of U.S. antitrust
policies asserted that it was easier for U.S. companies to engage in technology development
alliances with foreign companies than with other U.S. firms, much to the detriment of U.S.
national competitiveness. This was clearly not true by the mid-1990s: both the HRDUs and the
FIRDU units were more extensively involved in such linkages at home than abroad, for all six
types of cooperative links, including those with competitors.
The comparison of the patterns of external technology cooperation in Asia with that in
Europe provides some food for thought. The HRDUs are less active in Asia than in Europe on all
six linkages. The FIRDUs are as active in horizontal links in Asia as they are in Europe, but they
are less likely to maintain vertical links (with customers and suppliers) in Asia. And both are much
less likely to maintain "expert linkages" -- that is, with universities and government labs or with
technical consultants -- in Asia than in Europe.
This last pattern suggests one explanation for the lower level of cooperative links in Asia:
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continuing scepticism about the degree to which technology development in Asia is original,
valuable, and distinctive. One interviewee, when asked about his unit's lack of technology links in
Asia, replied that all the Asians' technology came from the U.S. in the first place, that he felt that
his unit was more likely to lose technology than to gain it by such technical links in Asia, and that
there really wasn't as much of interest there as he found in Europe. Other interviews suggested
other explanations. One is that a regional approach whereby a center or an alliance in one country
in the region provides wider geographic access -- a strategy increasingly common in Europe -- is
less viable in Asia, where the national technology systems are less interactive than they are in
Europe. Moreover, Asia is less well-established operating terrain for US firms than is Europe, and
many units have not had the time to develop the knowledge of potential partners and the
cross-border capabilities in Asia to engage as effectively in extended alliances there. And for US
firms, Japan, which is the undisputed technology leader in Asia, poses more formidable problems
of language and access to centers of expertise than do most European countries.
The salience of the familiarity and access factors may be gauged by looking at the
difference in the Asian linkages of home country units in US FIRDUs whose companies have
technology development units in Asia and those whose companies do not (Exhibit 10).
EXHIBIT 10 ABOUT HERE
The cooperative linkages of the firms with technology development units in the region are
comparable to those in Europe (virtually all of the companies in the US FIRDU group do have
technology development centers in Europe, and so a similar comparison in that region is not
possible) -- with the exception of the expert organization linkages, which remain significantly
lower in Asia. But these data suggest that having a unit in the region can provide a "bridge", in
terms of both information and support for developing a cooperative relationship, which is lacking
for the HRDUs and the units in firms without such a center.
We can also compare the local cooperative knowledge creation links of FIRDU subsidiaries
in order to assess how "embedded" they are in local technology systems. These links are not, of
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course, themselves cross-border links, but they extend the technology reach of the local technology
development subsidiaries of the MNE and thereby provide extended resources for intra-company
knowledge creation processes. They also, as the previous exhibit suggested, can provide a
cross-national "bridge" for their parent organizations into the local technology system.
EXHIBIT 11 ABOUT HERE
As Exhibit I I shows, these units are deeply embedded in their local technology systems, and in
very similar fashion. Even the Asian units (although their number is very small and we cannot
make statistical significance tests with so small a sample) have developed local external knowledge
creation partnerships to an extent virtually indistinguishable from their counterparts in Europe and
comparable foreign-owned units in the U.S. Although we have no control group for the US
FIRDU subsidiaries, we can compare the non-US-FIRDU subsidiaries located in the US with the
HRDUs and the US FIRDU home units. When we do, we find there is no statistically significant
difference in terms of technology development linkages with local organizations, at least on this
admittedly coarse-grained measure.
One further issue that these data allow us to explore is whether the kind of external
knowledge creation links that companies create abroad is similar to the kind they develop at home.
We must remind ourselves that we are working with a very coarse-grained measure here -- simply
having or not having a technology development cooperative link with a certain category of external
organization. But the data are suggestive (Exhibit 12).
EXHIBIT 12 ABOUT HERE
Exhibit 12 divides the US-owned, US-located units -- the HRDUs and the US FIRDU home
country units -- into eight categories for the three most common external partnerships, the
"alliances, JVs, and consortia"; customers; and universities. The eight categories are: those which
have no links, domestic or international, with that type of external organization; those which have
only domestic (i.e. U.S.) partners; three categories of those which have US and international
partners (U.S. + European; "Triad" -- that is, U.S., European, and Asian; and U.S. and Asian);
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and three categories in which the unit has international but not domestic partners (European
partners only, Asian only, and European and Asian). The most immediately obvious observation
is how few units have links with international but not domestic partners. The number is largest for
the "alliances" type of partner: 8 HRDU units and 22 FIRDUs (15% of the total in both cases).
For customers and universities, none of the HRDUs and only a very small fraction of the FIRDUs
have international but not domestic partners (5% and 3% respectively). The figures are very
similar for the other three types of partners, which are not presented here only for reasons of
space. Moreover, it is striking how few of the units, in either HRDU or FIRDUs, have links at
home and in Asia but not in Europe. The pattern seems to one of incremental internationalization in
external technology cooperation, comparable to the incremental pattern found in the process of
expanding operations internationally in production (see for example the classic piece Johanson &
Vahlne, 1977). In external networking across borders, R&D units, like the companies in
developing their international capabilities in general, build their border-crossing capabilities over
time.
The issue of border-crossing capabilities raises a final issue about external knowledge
creation linkages: do R&D units use them as a substitute for internal international knowledge
creation links? Clearly for HRDUs, they can serve as a functional equivalent to or substitute for
their own R&D units abroad. But in FIRDUs, are the units that are less engaged in international
joint knowledge creation internally more likely to engage in external linkages as a substitute? The
data in fact indicate the opposite: that the units with low levels of intra-company joint knowledge
creation are also less active in external linkages. For the 149 US-owned FIRDU home units, the
correlation between the 5-category raw data for cross-border internal technology cooperation and
the 12-category variable for the total number of types of external technology partnerships outside
the US (six each in Europe and Asia) is .379 (significant at a level of p<.001). Exhibit 13
provides these same data in a reduced and more visually interpretable format.
EXHIBIT 13 ABOUT HERE
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This strongly suggests that a common core of border-crossing capabilities, particularly in terms of
moving people and knowledge across borders, undergirds both internal and external international
knowledge creating networks, and that units develop and use that core in both contexts.
CROSS-BORDER KNOWLEDGE CREATION PROCESSES IN R&D
Let us now move beyond the data gathered from the MIT-IRI study to look somewhat more
conceptually at the processes of joint cross-border knowledge creation in the R&D function in
MNEs.
In one of the few explicit discussions of the basic principles of cross-border knowledge
creation to be found in the literature on MNEs, Ikujiro Nonaka has defined global knowledge
creation as "global synergy of the local tacit knowledge and the global articulate knowledge" (1990:
86). Clearly a core element of global knowledge creation is, as Nonaka makes clear, bringing
together knowledge that is geographically dispersed. But as he also indicates, "local" and "global"
can have two very distinct dimensions. One is the location of the knowledge (where it is); the
other concerns its nature (the kind of knowledge it is). In terms of location, "local" usually means
situated in a single subsidiary outside the central R&D organization, whereas "global" means that it
is located centrally (by "central" one usually means in the home country, where most firms still
have most of their innovative activity concentrated, particularly R&D, but in the transnational or
"network" model of the MNC it can mean widely shared in the network). The location of
knowledge can be most usefully be described in geographically specific terms.
The nature of "local" and "global" knowledge is a more complex issue. Nonaka sees local
knowledge as tacit, and global knowledge as explicit. While we found that this was often the case
in the various examples of international knowledge creation we collected, it was not always so.
Sometimes locally situated knowledge was highly explicit: for example, knowledge of the
projected future needs of local customers, or local national standards. And much of the centrally
located knowledge is tacit. A more consistent distinction in terms of the nature of knowledge
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seemed to be between knowledge that was location-specific (that is, applicable to and in a specific,
circumscribed local context) and knowledge that was, for want of a better term, generic (that is,
applicable in and to all similar contexts). Location-specific knowledge can indeed be tacit, but it
can also be explicit: for example, national regulations governing electrical transmission standards,
the kind of building materials that function best in the British housing industry, or the preferences
of French manufacturers in terms of the functionality of production equipment. Generic
knowledge can vary by context, but only when the contexts themselves can be described in general
rather than idiosyncratic terms: for example, the boiling point of water varies by altitude, but
"altitude" is itself a generic descriptor of context ("X feet above sea-level", as opposed to "at the
top of Mount Rainier"). In technology terms, generic knowledge that varies by context can include
such examples as the technologies needed for motors operating in extremely polluted or humid
environments, the kind of operating system needed to support complete non-alphabetical scripts in
software programming, or the miniaturization technologies needed for products in markets that
prefer small-scale, space-saving attributes. There is a dynamic interaction between generic and
location-specific knowledge akin to that between tacit and explicit knowledge: often generic
knowledge is expanded by the need to incorporate or explain location-specific knowledge (for
example, the development of technologies needed for motors operating in extremely polluted
environments can be derived by examining carefully the motors that work best in Mexican
factories). And location-specific knowledge is expanded by applying generic knowledge to
particular contexts.
Nonaka's definition does, however, alert us to a very important point: like tacit knowledge,
location-specific knowledge is difficult to move across borders and to share across locations,
largely because an understanding of the local context is often necessary to give it validity. This
difficulty is compounded by the fact that in most contexts generic knowledge is seen as being
"higher-order" knowledge than location-specific knowledge. This can be a source of some tension
in cross-border, as in cross-functional, interactions. And although ideally the distinction between
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location-specific and generic is objective, in practice it is not uncommon for location-specific
knowledge to be seen as generic by its holders, especially in the MNC's home country. In
particular, engineers and scientists in R&D units often see technology-related knowledge --
especially their own knowledge -- as generic, and market-related knowledge as location-specific.
This causes problems when the technical knowledge is in fact location-specific (i.e. it applies in the
product or process context in which the engineers are located but not another location, where
surrounding conditions may vary considerably) -- a fact that most technical people are very
reluctant to recognize.
One example concerns a product which is usually seen as among the most internationally
standardized in the world: the color television set. When Japanese companies first began trying to
sell their sets to Western distributors, they were astonished to hear complaints about the quality of
the color, which they regarded as superior to that of many Western manufacturers. Considerable
investigation showed that whereas most Japanese viewers watched television under overhead
fluorescent lighting, most Americans watched it in rooms lit by standard bulbs, and most
Europeans watched television in dark rooms. Color quality varied considerably depending on the
lighting conditions under which the set was watched. The "generic" knowledge about color quality
held by the Japanese R&D organizations turned out to have a larger element of location-specific
knowledge than they had realized. Note that this was a technical problem -- the maintenance of
colour quality under a wide variety of lighting conditions. Considerable further technology
development on generic technologies for improving and increasing the range of color quality was
necessary to develop a product whose color could be adjusted to fit the requirements of various
markets. 7
This last example exemplifies the classic mode of joint cross-border knowledge-creation in
R&D, indicated by Nonaka's definition of global knowledge creation as the synergy between local
tacit and global explicit knowledge: combining generic knowledge located in the central R&D
organization with location-specific knowledge in various subsidiaries to produce locally-tailored
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products. In this mode, the key role of the local R&D unit in a dispersed network is to be the
repository of location-specific knowledge, in explicit rather than tacit form as much as possible, to
facilitate the combining process, which can take place primarily at the center, in the local
subsidiaries, or, increasingly, in a "virtual co-location" setting (where there are dense
communications links across two or more locations), with varying degrees of central and local
participation. As the example of the color television set indicated, often the location-specific
knowledge demands further development of generic knowledge to produce appropriate products or
processes. In HRDUs, combining dispersed location-specific and central generic knowledge is
not, as a rule, cross-border knowledge creation within the R&D function, since the
location-specific knowledge is usually supplied by local marketing people (especially those in
technical sales and support) or local manufacturing personnel; the cross-border aspects of the
knowledge-creation process are therefore cross-functional. There are cases, however, where R&D
personnel are dispatched to other locations to absorb location-specific knowledge and bring it back
to the center for the knowledge combining process. A well-documented example is provided by
the development of the Nissan Primera described in Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995).
A second pattern of joint cross-border knowledge creation is that of combining generic
knowledgefrom several locations. Two of the reasons given for the increased internationalization
of R&D over the last decade assume that the target of geographic expansion is generic technical
knowledge, rather than local adaptation capabilities: the increased dispersion of centers of scientific
excellence around the world, and the shortage of scientists and engineers in the home country,
which can be addressed by hiring technical personnel in other countries (Westney, 1991;
Granstrand, Hakanson & Sjolander, 1992; Howells, 1995). Where the dispersed generic
knowledge is complementary, joint knowledge creation has potentially high pay-offs. A
well-documented case of this is the development of liquid detergent in Proctor and Gamble, where
technical centers in Europe, North America, and Japan contributed the complementary generic
knowledge that they had developed in order to respond to the particular needs of their local markets
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(Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1990). In their introduction to their edited volume on the internationalization
of R&D, Granstrand, Hakanson, and Sjolander pointed out that "Creating and maintaining
technological competitive advantage increasingly require access to a wider range of scientific and
technological skills and knowledge than is available in the home market" and that consequently we
increasingly see foreign R&D units that are "charged with the creation and renewal of core
technological capabilities" (Granstrand, Hakanson & Sjolander, 1992: p. 9). This involves not
only combining dispersed generic knowledge in the context of specific projects to develop new
products or product platforms, but also another mode of combining geographically dispersed
generic knowledge: the creation of ongoing "competence communities" to link geographically
dispersed specialists of various types in an ongoing learning community to sustain and develop
generic knowledge in key technologies.
Yet another -- and much less studied -- mode of joint cross-border knowledge creation
involves sharing location specific knowledge. One of the oft-cited advantages of the MNC is its
internal variety -- to review the earlier quotation from Arnoud de Meyer "learning about different
markets, different problem-solving methods, different sources of technological progress, different
culture, different competitors...."(De Meyer, 1992: 169). Much of this knowledge is
location-specific, but this does not mean it is not relevant for other locations. There are two kinds
of joint knowledge creation based on dispersed location-specific knowledge. One is using
location-specific knowledge as a base for developing generic knowledge, through abstraction and
hypothesis formation and testing (for example, why does a certain material work better in the
high-humidity, high-pollution environment of a certain tropical metropolitan market?). A second
mode is moving directly from location-specific knowledge to location-specific knowledge through
analogy (certain kinds of customers prefer X features in the product in France -- what kinds of
customers in the US might be like them; this kind of motor works best in Mexico City-- what
environments in the US are like Mexico City?).
In summary, then, we can identify at least four distinct cross-border knowledge creation
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processes:
(1) Combining centrally-located generic knowledge with locally dispersed location-specific
knowledge to add value to products and improve processes (the "classic" mode);
(2) Combining generic knowledge from two or more locations (the "transnational" mode);
(3) Joint cross-border interactions using location-specific knowledge as a base for generating
generic knowledge for transfer to other locations;
(4) Using analogy to apply location-specific knowledge from one location to another.
The first process can occur in a number of venues, from the major cross-border-project to
relatively short "technology transfer" interactions. The second usually revolves around large-scale
cross-border joint projects. We know much less about the third and fourth modes, because they
have been less studied, but our interview-based examples suggest that they are more likely to occur
as a by-product of the interaction of people across borders in various ways, rather than in specific
projects.
Although adding yet another category to the typology of knowledge may seem to be
unnecessary elaboration, the distinction between generic and location-specific knowledge can help
to address some key issues in international knowledge creation. For example, we saw earlier that
different kinds of travel seem to be effective in different contexts. Given the assumption that
location-specific knowledge is more difficult to share across borders than generic knowledge, and
that tacit location-specific knowledge is the most difficult to share, then we can suggest that fitting
travel patterns to the kind of knowledge sharing is one way to make better use of cross-border
travel of technical personnel (see Exhibit 14).
EXHIBIT 14 ABOUT HERE
Information technology links and short visits may well be adequate for sharing explicit generic
knowledge across borders, whereas sharing tacit generic knowledge might benefit from short-term
transfers. Sharing explicit location-specific knowledge may be accomplished through a
combination of visits and short-term transfers, whereas sharing tacit location-specific knowledge
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may be the venue where long-term transfers are most effective. It should be possible to test these
relationships empirically.
Finally, one of the most difficult questions facing MNEs today is how geographically
dispersed their R&D ought to be. No company can afford to match the dispersal of R&D to the
dispersion of markets or even of production; most companies have, and will continue to have a
smaller proportion of R&D abroad than of either production or sales. One answer has been the
extent to which the technology-related knowledge needed to compete effectively is geographically
dispersed and locally embedded. Indeed, it is now a commonplace to say that much useful
knowledge is locally embedded, with the implication that one must have a physical presence there
(usually in the form of an R&D unit) to gain access to that information. But "locally embedded"
can have several meanings:
(a) a high proportion of tacit knowledge;
(b) a high proportion of location-specific knowledge;
(c) knowledge dispersed among several local organizations;
(d) any combination of the above.
How one goes about gaining access to such knowledge will be greatly affected by which of these
aspects is applicable.
The key factor is indeed the level of dispersion of relevant technological knowledge. But
given the relative ease with which explicit generic knowledge can be transferred across borders, it
is useful to make some finer distinctions. The geographic dispersion of tacit generic knowledge is
a more important motivator for the internationalization of R&D than that of explicit generic
knowledge. An even more important criterion is the level of value added by location-specific
knowledge to the products and processes of the business. The higher that level is, and the greater
the proportion of tacit location-specific knowledge within that level, the greater the potential
advantages of the geographic dispersion of knowledge creation capabilities.
To summarize the main argument of this paper, cross-border knowledge creation is
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extensive in MNEs and in all likelihood will increase in importance over the coming years.
Studying new product development projects probably remains the most promising locus for
research aimed at understanding the processes of international knowledge creation. But this should
not be the only level of analysis. Research on the development of cross-border capabilities at both
the organizational systems level and at the level of the border-crossing individuals -- moving across
borders on short visits and short-term transfers as well as long-term expatriate assignments -- is an
essential complement to project-level research, and has relevance for cross-border learning well
beyond the R&D function.
30
REFERENCES
Aaker, D. A. (1989). Managing assets and skills: the key to a sustainable competitive
advantage. California Management Review, 31(2), 91-106.
Amit, R., & Schoemaker, P. J. H. (1993). Strategic assets and organizational rent.
Strategic Management Journal. 14(1), 33-46.
Bartlett, C. A. (1986). Building and Managing the Transnational: The New Organizational
Challenge. In M. E. Porter (Ed.), Competition in Global Industries, (pp. 367-404). Boston, MA:
Harvard Business School Press.
Bartlett, C. A., & Ghoshal, S. (1986). Tap your subsidiaries for global reach. Harvard
Business Review. 64(4), 87-94.
Bartlett, C. A., & Ghoshal, S. (1989). Managing Across Borders: The Transnational
Solution. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
Bartlett, C. A., & Ghoshal, S. (1990). Managing innovation in the transnational
corporation. In C. A. Bartlett, Y. Doz, & G. Hedlund (Eds.), Managing the Global Firm,.
London: Routledge.
Buckley, P. J., & Casson, M. C. (1976). The future of the Multinational Enterprise.
London: Macmillan.
Cantwell, J. A. (1989). Technological Innovation and Multinational Corporations. Oxford:
Basil Blackwell.
Casson, M. (Ed.). (1991). Global Research Strategy and International Competitiveness.
Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Cohen, W., & Levinthal, D. (1990). Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on Learning
and Innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly. 35(1), 128-152.
De Meyer, A. (1991). Tech Talk: How managers are stimulating global R&D
communication. Sloan Management Review, (Spring), 49-58.
31
De Meyer, A. (1992). "The Management of International R&D Operations". In O.
Granstrand, L. Hakason, & S. Sjolander (Eds.), Technology Management and International
Business: The Internationalization of R&D, (pp. 163-179). Chichester, UK: John Wiley & Sons.
Dunning, J. (1981). International Production and the Multinational Enterprise. London:
Allen and Unwin.
Gast, A., & Lessard, D. (1996). Managing Multi-point Learning in the Multinational Firm
(Working paper ): MIT Sloan School of Management.
Ghoshal, S. (1987). Global Strategy: An Organizing Framework. Strategic Management
Journal. 8(5), 425-440.
Granstrand, O., Hakanson, L., & Sjolander, S. (1992). Technology Management and
International Business. Chichester, UK: John Wiley and Sons Ltd.
Hakanson, L. (1990). International decentralization of R&D - the organizational
challenges. In Y. D. C. A. Bartlett, and Gunnar Hedlune (Ed.), Managing the Global Firm, (pp.
256-278). London: Routledge.
Hedlund, G. (1986). The Hypermodern MNE: A Heterarchy? Human Resource
Management. 25, 9-35.
Hedlund, G. and Ridderstrahle, J. (1995). "International Development Projects: Key to
Competitiveness, Impossible, or Mismanaged?" International Studies of Management and
Organisation 25-1/2: 158-184.
Howells, J. R. (1995). Going Global: The use of IT Networks in Research and
Development. Research Policy. 24(2), 169-184.
Johanson, J., & Vahlne, J.-E. (1977). The Internationalization Process of the Firm -- A
Model of Knowledge Development and Increasing Foreign Market Commitments. Journal of
International Business Studies. 8(1), 23-32.
Kogut, B. (1983). Foreign Direct Investment as a Sequential Process. In C. P.
Kindleberger & D. B. Audretsch (Eds.), The Multinational Corporation in the 1980s, (pp. 38-56).
32
Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
Kogut, B. (1985a). Designing Global Strategies: Comparative and Competitive Value
Added Chains. Sloan Management Review. Summer, 15-28.
Leonard-Barton, D. (1992). Core capabilities and core rigidites: a paradox in managing
new product development. Strategic Management Journal, 13(Summer Special Issue), 111-125.
Nelson, R., & Winter, S. (1982). An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change.
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
Nelson, R. (1995). Evolutionary Theorizing about Economic Change. In N. J. Smelser
and R. Swedberg (Eds.), The Handbook of Economic Sociology. Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
Nohria, N., & Ghoshal, S. (1997). The Differentiated Network: Organizing Multinational
Corporations for Vaue Creation. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc.
Nonaka, I. (1990). Managng globalization as a self-renewing process: experiences of
Japanese MNEs. In C. A. Bartlett, Y. Doz, & G. Hedlund (Eds.), Managing the Global Firm.
London: Routledge.
Nonaka, I., & Takeuchi, H. (1995). The Knowledge-Creating Company: How Japanese
Companies Create the Dynamics of Innovation. New York: Oxford University Press.
Prahalad, C. K., & Hamel, G. (1990). The core competence of the corporation. HBR.
68(3), 79-91.
Rugman, A. M. (1981). Inside the Multinationals: The economics of internal markets.
London: Croom Helm.
Solvell, O., & Zander, I. (1995). Preface (The Dynamic Multinational Firm). International
Studies of Management and Organization. 25(1/2), 3-16.
Stalk, G., Evans, P., & Shulman, L. E. (1992). Competing on Capabilities: The New
Rules of Competition. Harvard Business Review. 70(2), 57-69.
Vernon, R. (1966). International Investment and International Trade in the Product Cycle.
33
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 190-207.
Vernon, R. (1979). The Product Cycle Hypothesis in a New International Environment.
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics. 41, 255-267.
Westney, D. E. (1991). Organizational Change and the Internationalization of R&D. In T.
Kochan & M. Useem (Eds.), Transforming Organizations, . New York: Oxford University Press.
34
ENDNOTES
1. Defining "innovation" and "knowledge creation" is a notoriously difficult task. In this paper, as
at this conference, the term "knowledge creation" is used instead of "innovation", although the
meaning of the two is very close (knowledge creation referring more to the process, and
"innovation" being used to refer either to the process or the outcome). Knowledge creation or
innovation is here considered in the context of the particular firm in which the specific knowledge -
- usually a product or a process (material or organizational) -- is developed, regardless of whether
that knowledge is "created" in the sense of never having existed anywhere before.
2.The lead on this kind of research was taken by European scholars, and much of the European
research on the topic is represented in Granstrand et al (1992).
3. Andreas Gast and Don Lessard in a recent working paper (1996) have pointed out that
capabilities in dispersed locations can be complementary or similar; joint knowledge creation in the
first case enhances the scope of the MNC, and in the second enhances scale.
4. There are obviously great differences across industries and companies in how these different
categories of technology development are defined; in this study, given the range of industries and
companies covered, we left it up to the responding individuals to decide on their unit's portfolio of
activities, without providing more detailed definitions.
5. This three-level (individual, work process, organization) typology builds on and modifies
somewhat Dorothy Leonard-Barton's very useful (1992) model.
6. It is worth noting that this pattern holds across the categories for the "worldwide leader"
35
mechanism: for the US FIRDU home units, the effectiveness ratios across the levels of interaction
from low to high are 51.4 %, 81.8%, and 71.9%.
7. I am indebted for this illustration to Mr. Takeyoshi Ohgai, formerly an executive of Matsushita
and now enrolled in the doctoral program at Kobe University's Institute of Management Research.
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EXHIBIT 1: VERTICAL TECHNOLOGY SCOPE
This table presents the ways in which mandates are clustered -- the shaded "boxes" are the
mandates undertaken by units in that category.
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EXHIBIT 2: CATEGORIES OF RESPONDING UNITS: HRDUs AND FIRDUs
NUMBER AVERAGE SIZE, AVERAGE AGE
EXHIBIT 3: LEVEL OF CROSS-BORDER KNOWLEDGE CREATION IN
FIRDUs, BY CATEGORY
Question (only on questionnaires for firms with international technology development units):
Approximately what percentage of the products and technologies your unit works on involve
some form of collaboration with the company's technical
are located?
units outside the country in which you
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TYPE OF UNIT Number of Average size (# Average Age
responding units of technical (yrs since
employees) est.)
US Firms - Home-based Technology 53 16.7% 106.3 27.6
Development Units only (HRDUs)
US Firms with International 149 46.8% 213.4 31.3
Technology Development Units
(FIRDUs) -- Home units
US Firms with International 71 22.3% 52.1 16.4
Technology Development Units
(FIRDUs) -- Foreign units
Non-US Firms with International 33 10.4% 125.0 13.8
Technology Development Units
(FIRDUs) -- US-based units
Non-US Firms with International 12 3.8% 121.2 11.1
Technology Development Units
(FIRDUs) -- Home units
TOTAL 318 100.0% 146.5 24.8
PERCENTOF US FIRDUs- US Non-US Non-US
PRODUCTS/TECHNOLOGIES Home units FIRDUs- FIRDUs- US FIRDUs-
INVOLVING CROSS-BORDER Foreign units Home
COOPERATION units units
None 3.4% 0 0 0
Less than 25% 43.8% 13.2% 33.5% 25.0%
25-50% 26.0% 22.1% 27.3% 33.3%
50-75% 26.7% 64.7% 39.4% 41.7%
TOTAL 99.9% 100% 100.2% 100%
(Number of units) (146) (68) (33) (12)
EXHIBIT 4: REASONS FOR INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL OF TECHNICAL
PERSONNEL IN FIRDUS, BY LEVEL OF CROSS-BORDER INTERACTION
Q: For your technical unit, how important are each of the following reasons for sending personnel
outside the country in which you are located? Responses on 1-5 scale where 5 = very important.
Following table presents the percentage of each type of unit rating the reason 4 or 5.
High Cross- Medium Cross- Low cross-
border border interaction border
interaction units units (n= 66) interaction units
(n= 101) (n = 92)
Work on a joint project with another 90.1% 74.2% 64.4%
unit.
Follow a project from R&D to 86.1% 81.8% 63.0%
manufacturing
Transfer technology (including 80.2% 72.2% 55.4%
"knowhow") from your unit to
another unit.
Transfer technology to your unit 64.4% 56.1% 41.3%
from another unit
Learn about another unit's products 65.3% 74.2% 55.4%
or technologies
Learn about customer or market 60.4% 65.3% 54.3%
requirements
Use specialized or expensive 31.7% 39.4% 18.5%
equipment
Coordinate plans about future 93.1% 72.7% 53.3%
products/technologies
Review goals, budgets, or recent 50.5% 50.0% 22.8%
performance
Evaluate the progress of a project 64.4% 62.1% 41.3%
Fill a position that could not be filled 27.7% 25.8% 10.9%
locally
Technical training or career 60.4% 66.7% 32.6%
development




EXHIBIT 5: MECHANISMS IN FIRDUS FOR LINKING TECHNOLOGY
DEVELOPMENT UNITS IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES
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Linking Mechanism % rating % "not tried" Effective-
"effective" ness ratio*
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
Frequent communication by phone, fax, 73.1% 1.5% 74.2%
e-mail
Video conference 76.9% 15.9% 91.4%
HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS: TRAVEL
Short visits (<3 weeks) by technical 80.2% 2.7% 82.4%
personnel
Short-term transfers (1-6 mths) of technical 38.6% 44.4% 69.4%
personnel
Long-term transfers (>6 mths) of technical 48.1% 37.7% 77.2%
personnel
RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND DECISION-MAKING
System for allocating costs & benefits of 13.6% 38.1% 22.0%
joint activities
Frequent meetings of top-ranking managers 46.7% 7.7% 50.6%
Different but complementary areas of 40.2% 11.6% 45.4%
expertise
Some overlap of areas of technical expertise 41.4% 5.0% 43.5%
Designating a single unit as worldwide leader 48.1% 23.1% 62.5%
within a business or technology
*"Effectiveness ratio" calculated by taking the % of those who used the mechanism who rated it as effective.
EXHIBIT 6: PROPORTION OF TECHNICAL PEOPLE TRAVELLING ACROSS
BORDERS, BY CATEGORY
Question: During the past year, approximately what percentage of your unit's personnel took at
least trip:
(a) (for FIRDUs) to another technical unit in the company outside the country in which you are
located?
(b) (for HRDUs) outside the country
0% 5% 10% 25% 50%
in which you are located?
75% 100%
PERCENT OF TECHNICAL US US Non-US Non-US
PERSONNEL TRAVELLING FIRDUs- FIRDUs- FIRDUs- FIRDUs-
INTERNATIONALLY Home units Foreign US units Home units
units
None 3.5% 12.5% 3.0% 0
5% 18.9% 15.6% 15.2% 18.2%
10% 37.1% 10.9% 30.3% 9.1%
25% 26.6% 21.9% 30.3% 45.5%
50% or more 14.0% 39.1% 21.2% 27.3%
TOTAL 100.1% 100% 100% 100.1% (12)
(Number of units) (143) (64) (33)
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EXHIBIT 9: CROSS-BORDER TECHNICAL COOPERATION WITH OUTSIDE
ORGANIZATIONS IN EUROPE AND ASIA BY HOME COUNTRY UNITS IN
US FIRMS - HRDUS AND FIRDUS
Q: During the past two years, has your unit participated in product, process, or
technology development activities with any of thefollowing organizations?
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TYPE OF CROSS-BORDER US EUROPE ASIA
JOINTTECHNOLOGY
DEVELOPMENT PARTNER HRDU FIRDU HRDU FIRDU HRDU FIRDU
HORIZONTAL COOPERATIVE LINKS
Alliance, JV, or consortium 60.4% 57.4% 49.1% 39.9% 26.4% 39.9%
Competitor 35.8% 25.7% 22.6% 12.8% 9.4% 13.5%
VERTICAL COOPERATIVE LINKS
Customer 77.4% 78.4% 39.6% 52.7% 22.6% 33.8%
Supplier (not owned by 64.2% 75.0% 22.6% 45.9% 15.1% 18.2%
company)
COOPERATIVE LINKS WITH "EXPERT ORGANIZATIONS"
University or public research 86.8% 73.0% 28.3% 41.2% 7.5% 8.1%
institute
Technical consultant or 83.0% 81.1% 35.8% 35.8% 7.5% 14.2%
contractor
. . . ~~~~~~~~_ 4 ._
" EXHIBIT 10: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JOINT TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
NETWORKS IN ASIA AND R&D CENTRE IN THE REGION
TYPE OF PARTNER With Centre Without Centre
(N=123) (N=26)
Alliance, JV, or consortium* 44.7% 15.4%
Competitor** 16.3% 0
Customer* 39.0% 7.7%
Supplier (not owned by company)** 21.1% 3.8%
University or public research institute 8.9% 3.8%
Technical consultant or contractor 16.3% 3.8%
*Chi-square test significance level <.01
**Chi-square test significance level <.05
EXHIBIT 11: LOCAL EXTERNAL TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT
LINKAGES, FIRDU SUBSIDIARIES
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TYPE OF EXTERNAL PARTNER Non-US-Owned US FIRDU units US FIRDU units
FIRDUs - R&D in Europe - % in Asia - % with
units in US - US with European Asian links
links (n = 33) links (n=55) (n=8)
Alliance, JV, or consortium 48.5% 43.3% 75.0%
Competitor 27.3% 28.3% 62.5%
Customer 87.9% 56.7% 75.0%
Supplier (not owned by company) 72.7% 61.7% 62.5%
University or public research institute 81.8% 65.0% 62.5%
Technical consultant or contractor 63.3% 58.3% 62.5%
L .~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~,,,
EXHIBIT 12: ALLIANCES AT HOME AND ABROAD: HRDUS AND U.S.
FIRDU HOME UNITS
EXHIBIT 13: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL
INTERACTIONS IN KNOWLEDGE CREATION, HOME COUNTRY UNITS OF
U.S. FIRDUS
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Location of Joint Alliances, JVs, Customers Universities
Knowledge Creation Links Consortia
with External Organizations HRDUs FIRDUs HRDUs FIRDUs HRDUs FIRDUs
No external JKC Links 24.5% 26.8% 22.6% 16.7% 13.2% 23.5%
US links only 22.6 17.4 37.7 28.2 54.7 33.6
US + Europe 18.9 12.1 17.0 18.1 24.5 31.5
US + Europe+ Asia (Triad) 18.9 22.1 22.6 30.2 3.8 6.7
US + Asia 0 6.0 0 2.0 3.8 1.3
Europe only 7.5 4.0 0 3.4 0 3.4
Asia only 3.8 9.4 0 0 0 0
Europe + Asia, no US 3.8 2.0 0 1.3 0 0
100% 99.8% 99.9% 99.9% 100% 100%
(n=53) ( =149) (ni=53) (n=149) (n=53) (n=149)
External Technology Low internal cross- Medium internal High internal
Partnerships outside the border interaction cross-border cross-border
U.S. - number of types (25% or less of interaction (25% or interaction (25% or
technology) less of technology) less of technology)
0-1 46.4% 23.7% 12.8%
2-5 40.6 52.6 41.0
6 or more 13.0 23.7 46.2
100% 100% 100%
(n = 69) i (n = 38) (n = 39)
EXHIBIT 14: THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE TYPE OF CROSS-
BORDER INTERACTION FOR EFFECTIVE JOINT KNOWLEDGE CREATION
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EXPLICIT KNOWLEDGE TACIT KNOWLEDGE
GENERIC Information Technology Short-term transfers
KNOWLEDGE Links
Short visits
LOCATION-SPECIFIC Short visits Long-term transfers
KNOWLEDGE Short-term transfers
.. ...I
